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Introduction 
Herbert Fingarette and Ann Fingarette Hasse have put before us 
a novel approach to the problem of mens rea or the mental element 
in crime (guilty mind)l. My purpose here is to provide sorne 
support for their theory in response to one of their critics. 
The problem of mens rea is, roughly, that although someone 
may behave in ways that are unlawful, that by itself does not 
appear to be sufficient grounds for regarding the agent guilty of 
criminal behavior. Such behavior has to involve sorne measure of 
intent or deliberation for it to constitute culpable conduct. Unless 
this were so, the simple fact of someone knocking over another 
would ipso facto qualify for assault. An individual who is coerced 
to steal would be judged a thief. More pertinently, someone with a 
darranged mind -due to whatever cause (e.g., drugs, alcohol, 
brain damage, or sorne psychological dysfunction)- would be 
condernned as fully culpable. 
We are aware of the distinction between human behavior and 
human action or conduct from many cases and from our common 
1. Herbert FINGARETTE and Anne FINGARETTE HASSE, Mental 
Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1979). 
214 TIBOR R. MACHAN 
sense. And we understandably seek a theoretical frarnework which 
best explains this awareness. 
The insanity pIe a, which harks back to the farnous M'Naghten's 
Case of 1843, has become unsatisfactory. For one, the problem is 
that just because someone at the time of engaging in criminal 
behavior may not know that he or she is doing so, that does not 
seem necessarily to exculpate the agent involved. The M'Naghten 
rase states: 
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must 
be clearly pro ved that at the time of the committing of the act, 
the party accused was laboring under such defect of reason, 
from disease of mind, as not to know the nature and quality 
of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong. 
The M'Naghten test, which refers to knowledge, was later 
revised to include reference to volition. In Davis v. United Sta tes 
(1895) the provision of "irresistible impulse" was added, so that 
even if one knew right from wrong, if one could not contain 
oneself from doing wrong, one would be considered criminally 
insane. 
In 1954 the ground for the insanity plea was further expanded, 
in Durham v. United States, when the District of Columbia Circuit 
held that "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful 
act was the product of mental disease or defect." This produced 
much constemation in the legal profession because there had been 
no clear concept of mental disease or defect in use within the law 
and, indeed, within the mental health profession. 
The American Law Institute wrote up yet another doctrine 
pertaining to the mens rea issue. It said that 
[A] person is not responsible ... if at the.time of [criminal] 
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
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substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct ... This is the law as applied today in the Federal 
courts. 
Contrary to what one might think, this doctrine did not manage 
to change the verdicts in the relevant cases. For example, as 
Senator Orrin Hatch observed, in connection with John Hinckley's 
defense after he shot Mr. Reagan, "Hinckley was allowed to 
contend that he 'lacked substantial capacity to appreciate crimi-
nality ... or to conform to the requirements of the law'. The jury in 
Hickley's trial was apparently so baffled by the hours of 
psychiatric testimony that they acquitted him on this standard"2. 
Clearly there is a lot more to all this. The essence of the matter 
is that often common sense suggests that when one is doing 
something one may well be insane in the sense in which the 
tradition of law suggests, yet that simply does not suffice to 
remove one's responsibility for one's behavior. Criminal insanity 
does not correspond to the way we ordinarily think about what is 
implied by mental imbalance. Normally it is not disputed that it is 
possible to get oneself into a state which, had one been more 
prudent, wise, or cautious, one would know would expose one to 
the threat of serious misbehavior. The simple case is when one 
becomes intoxicated. More complicated cases involve when one 
carries a grudge, harbors resentment, or otherwise thinks ill of 
another which may prepare one to discard good judgment when 
confronted with the chance of harming that persono Neglecting to 
learn to restrain oneself, in case one is angry, could also lead to 
misbehavior, yet none of this would suffice to fully exculpate one. 
Fingarette and Hasse published their work in 1979, but the 
issue gained full public attention when John Hinckley attempted to 
assassinate Ronald Reagan in 1980. While clearly not an ordinary 
2. Orrin G. HATCH, "Insanity Defense Reforrn," Criminal Justice Ethics, 
Vol. 3 (SurnrnerlFall 1984), p. 87. 
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chap, Hinckley seemed mostly confused and silly, rather than in 
any credible sense mentally disabled. Yet his attomeys marshalled 
expert testimony which by law convinced the jury that Hinckley 
could not be convicted as culpable for attempted murder. Such a 
result just did not sit well with the publico 
Disability of Mind 
What is the Fingarette/Hasse solution? Essentially they argue 
for a position that seems later to have been picked up by Senator 
Orrin Hatch. As surnmarized by Hugo Bedau, 
The D.O.M. doctrine (if adopted) would confront the jury 
with a sequen ce of four questions: 1) Did the accused 
cornmit the offense as charged?; 2) If so, did he suffer from 
D.O.M. so as to affect his culpability for the offense?; 3) If 
so, does he incur any culpability for the origin ofhis D.O.M. 
(as will typically be true where the D.O.M. involves 
intoxication or addiction)?; 4) Regardless of how; 5) is 
answered, does he still suffer from D.O.M.?3. 
Many features of this doctrine are attractive to cornmon sense 
thinking. One can distinguish between total and partial disability of 
mind. One can, for example, distinguish between self-induced and 
inflicted D.O.M. The burden of proving D.O.M. is on the defense. 
And there are others 1 will not touch on. 
What 1 wish to discuss is that a feature of the FingarettelHasse 
D.O.M. doctrine has been criticized on grounds that it appears to 
reduce the value of their contribution to the discussion. 1 wish to 
concentrate on this feature in the rest of my remarks. 1 believe that 
3. Hugo Adam BEDAU, "Soundness of Mind and 'Mental Setting"', 
Hastings Center Report, April 1980, p. 47. 
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D.O.M. can be a valuable concept provided certain aspects of it are 
made more explicit. 
Human Reason 
D.O.M. involves "any kind of individual mental abnormality, 
pathology, impairment, defect, or disorder, and of whatever 
origin" [if it bears on] "the capacity for rational (i.e., responsible) 
shaping of beliefs, moods, intentions, decisions, and actions in 
regard to criininallaw standards"4. But aproblem seems to arise, 
according to Professor Bedau: 
Here one notices a disconcerting circularity. If "rational" 
is virtually a synonym for "responsible," then little if any 
light can be shed on the criteria for responsibility by 
appealing to the concept of rational conduct. Although this 
circularity could have easily been avoided, it is a symptom of 
the deeper difficulty5. 
As FingarettelHasse's put it, one is irrational if one is "unable 
to ... take into account, while forming his intentions, the criminal 
significance [of one's action]"6. And a person will be unable to do 
this when various "presumptions of fact" are missing7. 
Among the facts that a rational person must accept, according to 
what FingarettelHasse say, are certain moral beliefs. They hold that 
one is not a rational agent if one does not acknowledge, for 
example, "murder as an evil- a 'crime' in a moral sense"8. They 
lead one to think that a rational person would have to know, as a 
general moral fact, that murder is evil. "In the upshot, however, 
without some such minimum shared background-nexus of basic 
perceptions and values, which provide the basic standards relevant 
4. FINGARETIFlHASSE, pp. 207, 21l. 
5. BEDAU, p. 47. 
6. FINGARETIFlHASSE, p. 210. 
7. Ibid., p. 224. 
8. Ibid. 
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to crimina '¡alum in se, there would, of course, be no 
community' . If a member of the community fails to be aware of 
such minimal moral feature of community life, he or she fails to be 
rational. "A person who can kill and yet sense no need for certain 
kinds of relevant excuse or justification is a person with no inner 
touchstone by which to assess conduct rationally in regard to 
law"lO. 
Now it seems to Bedau, for example, that this view undermines 
the power of the doctrine of disability of mind. Granted much of 
the Fingarette/Hasse views on what is required for human 
community life, the points they raise seem somewhat to leave in 
doubt what renders an accused person guilty of a crime. 
One objection to their view is that it is just in virtue of the fact 
that irresponsible behavior flouts or evades concerns about general 
moral matters (which should be the province of the law, e.g., the 
moral crime of murder) that many societies are defective human 
communities. We know, for example, that in sorne cultures 
"human life is cheap". We know that in sorne societies the respect 
due to human beings is simply not extended to women. And 
elsewhere there seems to be blindness to such moral facts as that 
racism is wrong and that individualliberty should be protected. 
The responsibility for such defects would seem to líe, at least in 
significant part, with the members of the society. They should 
normally be found guilty of the moral insensitivity that their 
societies embody. Yet Fingarette/Hasse's apparent equivocation 
between rationality as acknowledgment of certain moral facts and 
as individual criminal responsibility would exculpate just such 
agents of criminal behavior. 
For example, would John Hinckley have been found culpable 
by the FingarettelHasse criterion of criminal responsibility? It is 
unclear. He might have had to be found suffering from an 
9. Ibid., p. 226. 
10. Ibid. 
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excusing disability of mind because he did not believe that 
assessinating a famous person is morally wrong, given his other 
convictions and purposes. But is that not exactly what explains 
why sorne societies behave in morally apalling ways? In South 
Africa they are more concerned with white solidarity, while in the 
Soviet Union the government prizes singularity ofpolitical purpose 
rather than individual freedom for its citizens. In earlier societies 
various religious convictions distracted people from certain moral 
facts, as they do now also in, for example, Iran. For individuals, 
as for entire cultures, sometimes moral facts are "out of mind". But 
does this imply any lack of rational capacity? 
FingrattelHassse perhaps do not fully embrace this view. After 
all, they regard capacity for rationality as the most important 
ingredient of criminal responsibility. But when they proposed what 
counts as evidence of lack of such capacity, they chose an 
inappropriate candidate, namely, lack of awareness of general 
moral truths. They c1early do not need the conception of rationality 
that is implicit in their example. 
Volitional Rationality 
While FingarettelHasse seem to wish to avoid metaphysical 
issues -lest they get involved in debates about natural versus 
positive law and the like1 L it seems such deeper discussions 
are unavoidable if their view is to be c1arified and made more 
palatable. The question has to be answered, what is the nature of 
human rationality? According to a sensible answer, would a 
rational individual have to know that murder is evil? 
First of aH, "rational" can refer to someone's capacity to reason 
or to someone's characteristic mode of behavior. It seems c1ear 
that a person incapable of reasoning is not fully responsible for 
11. Ibid., p. 224n. 
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his conduct. Even if this incapacity had been self-induced, 
responsibility would not likely be full. This is similar to the 
intoxication/addiction situation. 
If, however, a person is just not engaging in rational condüct 
prompted by not ' having engaged in rational thought, full 
responsibility may yet be ascribable. The reason is that it is 
arguable that one ought to think under certain circumstances and 
the failure to do so does not qualify as an excuse. This point is 
well brought out in a discussion by H. L. A. Hart: 
[N]o satisfactory account of what it is which makes 
"conduct" voluntary or involuntary, capable of covering both 
acts and ommissions can be given in [the] terminology of 
"states ofmind" or "mental attitude". What is required (as a 
minimum) is the notion of a general ability or capacity to 
control bodily movements, which is usually present but may 
be absent or impaired12. 
Fingarette/Hasse appear, unwittingly at least, to invoke the 
"states of mind" criterion for responsible conduct when they make 
part of the requisite rationality a matter of what the agent believes -
to wit, that murder is evil. Hart indicates further why that is not 
adequate: 
[I]t is important to pause and note that if anything is 
"blameworthy", it is not the "state of mind" but the agent's 
failure to inform himself of the facts and so getting into this 
"state of mind" 13. 
The point may be put as follows: The voluntariness of conduct 
stems from the fact that persons can become aware of relevant facts 
12. H. L. A. HART, Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 142. 
13. Ibid., p. 143. 
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as a matter of their own volition. They can choose to attend or 
choose not to attend, to pay or not to pay heed. If in the context of 
human community life persons choose not to pay heed to the moral 
requirement ofrespecting human life, property, freedom, etc., this 
will leave them ignorant of the fact, for example, that murder is 
evil. And that would seem to shqw they lack rational capacity. 
I don't think that Fingarette/Hasse's want this result. While they 
may accept that such persons are irrational, they may not wish to 
identify this with lack of rational capacity. In a sense such persons 
will act irrationally, without good reason for what they do. But 
they might easily have been rational in the sense that they might 
have elected to exercised their rational capacity, something that 
they could weH possess but fail to activate. 
When John Hinckley became preoccupied with some narrow 
objective -impressing his beloved- he may weH have managed to 
obliterate a great deal of what he should keep in mind. He may 
indeed have ended in a state of ignorance about the significance of 
human life or Ronald Reagan's status as a human being or any 
number of other matters which a sustained activation of one's 
rationality would bring to one's awareness. Yet this could weH be 
a matter of Hinckley's own "failure to inform himself of the facts 
and so getting into this 'state of [ignorance]". 
Last Reflections 
Does a person have the capacity to initiate his or her thinking 
process, of "getting into" some state of mind on his or her own 
accord? This is indeed the ancient philosophical question of 
whether at a most fundarnentallevel one is a free agent. If one is a 
free agent, it would appear that being free just within this sphere of 
one's self would make the most sense. 
AH the best arguments for free will suggest that freedom is a 
matter of one's control over one's consciousness. Philosophers as 
222 TIBOR R. MACHAN 
diverse as Aristotle, Kant, Sartre, and Hart seem to view the matter 
along such lines. The arguments about why determinism is self-
refuting do the same. And finally the occasional scientific accounts 
ofthe nature offree will also lead to this conclusion14. 
Perhaps the aboye adjustment will help further to preserve in 
law the notions of criminal responsibility as well as sensible 
excusing conditions based on disabilities of mind 15. 
14. See, respectively, Joseph BOYLE, G. GRISEZ, and O. TOLLEFSEN, 
"Determinism, Freedom, and Self-Referentail Arguments", The Review of 
Metaphysics (September 1972): 3-37, and Roger W. SPERRY, "Changing 
Concepts of Consciousness", Perspectives in Biology and Medicine (August 
1976): 9-19. 
15. 1 wish to express my thanks for the support of my work on this and 
related papers by the John M. Olin, Reason and Progress Foundations. 
